所谓「自主研发」
严复曾说：
> 中国之政，所以日形其绌，不足争存者，亦坐不本科学，而与通理公例违行故耳。是故以科学为艺，则西艺实西政之本。设谓艺非科学，则政艺二者，乃并出于科学，若左右手然，未闻左右之相为本末也。
https://blog.retompi.com/post/deceptive-file-format/
严复曾说：
> 中国之政，所以日形其绌，不足争存者，亦坐不本科学，而与通理公例违行故耳。是故以科学为艺，则西艺实西政之本。设谓艺非科学，则政艺二者，乃并出于科学，若左右手然，未闻左右之相为本末也。
https://blog.retompi.com/post/deceptive-file-format/
Scientists Used to Love Twitter. Thanks to Elon Musk, They’re Giving Up on It
Scientists are abandoning X in droves, according to a recent survey by Nature. Of the survey respondents, “more than half reported that they have reduced the time they spend on the platform in the past six months and just under 7% have stopped using it altogether.”
Scientists are abandoning X in droves, according to a recent survey by Nature. Of the survey respondents, “more than half reported that they have reduced the time they spend on the platform in the past six months and just under 7% have stopped using it altogether.”
Los Angeles Times
Column: Scientists used to love Twitter. Thanks to Elon Musk, they're giving up on it
Scientists came to see Twitter as an indispensable tool for communicating with each other and the public. As X, it's turned into a source of scientific misinformation and lies.
严复在 1895 年写了一篇文章《救亡决论》，虽然写于 128 年前，但此文今天读来似乎完全没有过时。
他主张废八股：
> 八股取士，使天下消磨岁月于无用之地，堕坏志节于冥昧之中，长人虚骄，昏人神智，上不足以辅国家，下不足以资事畜。破坏人才，国随贫弱。此之不除，徒补苴罅漏，张皇幽渺，无益也，虽练军实、讲通商，亦无益也。
讲西学：
> 盖欲救中国之亡，则虽尧、舜、周、孔生今，舍班孟坚所谓通知外国事者，其道莫由。而欲通知外国事，则舍西学洋文不可，舍格致亦不可。
痛斥愚民政策：
> 日本年来立格致学校数千所，以教其民，而中国忍此终古，二十年以往，民之愚智，益复相悬，以与逐利争存，必无幸矣。
批判中国传统：
> 今夫中国，非无兵也，患在无将帅。中国将帅，皆奴才也，患在不学而无术。
> 晚近更有一种自居名流，于西洋格致诸学，仅得诸耳剽之馀，于其实际，从未讨论。意欲扬己抑人，夸张博雅，则于古书中猎取近似陈言，谓西学皆中土所已有，羌无新奇。如星气始于臾区，勾股始于隶首；浑天昉于玑衡，机器创于班墨；方诸阳燧，格物所宗；烁金腐水，化学所自；重学则以均发均悬为滥觞，光学则以临镜成影为嚆矢；蜕水蜕气，气学出于亢仓；击石生光，电学原于关尹。哆哆硕言，殆难缕述。
> 华风之敝，八字尽之：始于作伪，终于无耻。
并借西人之口总结道：
> 中国自命有化之国也，奈何肉刑既除，宫闱犹用阉寺；束天下女子之足，以之遏淫禁奸；谳狱无术，不由公听，专事毒刑榜笞。三者之俗，蛮猓不如，仁义非中国有也。
他主张废八股：
> 八股取士，使天下消磨岁月于无用之地，堕坏志节于冥昧之中，长人虚骄，昏人神智，上不足以辅国家，下不足以资事畜。破坏人才，国随贫弱。此之不除，徒补苴罅漏，张皇幽渺，无益也，虽练军实、讲通商，亦无益也。
讲西学：
> 盖欲救中国之亡，则虽尧、舜、周、孔生今，舍班孟坚所谓通知外国事者，其道莫由。而欲通知外国事，则舍西学洋文不可，舍格致亦不可。
痛斥愚民政策：
> 日本年来立格致学校数千所，以教其民，而中国忍此终古，二十年以往，民之愚智，益复相悬，以与逐利争存，必无幸矣。
批判中国传统：
> 今夫中国，非无兵也，患在无将帅。中国将帅，皆奴才也，患在不学而无术。
> 晚近更有一种自居名流，于西洋格致诸学，仅得诸耳剽之馀，于其实际，从未讨论。意欲扬己抑人，夸张博雅，则于古书中猎取近似陈言，谓西学皆中土所已有，羌无新奇。如星气始于臾区，勾股始于隶首；浑天昉于玑衡，机器创于班墨；方诸阳燧，格物所宗；烁金腐水，化学所自；重学则以均发均悬为滥觞，光学则以临镜成影为嚆矢；蜕水蜕气，气学出于亢仓；击石生光，电学原于关尹。哆哆硕言，殆难缕述。
> 华风之敝，八字尽之：始于作伪，终于无耻。
并借西人之口总结道：
> 中国自命有化之国也，奈何肉刑既除，宫闱犹用阉寺；束天下女子之足，以之遏淫禁奸；谳狱无术，不由公听，专事毒刑榜笞。三者之俗，蛮猓不如，仁义非中国有也。
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TomBen’s Web Excursions
严复在 1895 年写了一篇文章《救亡决论》，虽然写于 128 年前，但此文今天读来似乎完全没有过时。 他主张废八股： > 八股取士，使天下消磨岁月于无用之地，堕坏志节于冥昧之中，长人虚骄，昏人神智，上不足以辅国家，下不足以资事畜。破坏人才，国随贫弱。此之不除，徒补苴罅漏，张皇幽渺，无益也，虽练军实、讲通商，亦无益也。 讲西学： > 盖欲救中国之亡，则虽尧、舜、周、孔生今，舍班孟坚所谓通知外国事者，其道莫由。而欲通知外国事，则舍西学洋文不可，舍格致亦不可。 痛斥愚民政策： > 日本年来立格致学…
中国数字时代
老牌恶棍｜“西方伪史论”为何在中国如此盛行？
近几年，西方伪史论在国内可谓相当盛行，一度成为一门显学，从者如云。而顾名思义，所谓西方伪史论就是质疑西方文明历史真实性的一门学说。该学说认为，关于古埃及、古希腊罗马的历史都是假的，系后人伪造。支持该学说的人一般被称为“西史证伪派”，其中不乏一些知名学者，甚至不少还为此著书立说。
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TomBen’s Web Excursions
严复在 1895 年写了一篇文章《救亡决论》，虽然写于 128 年前，但此文今天读来似乎完全没有过时。 他主张废八股： > 八股取士，使天下消磨岁月于无用之地，堕坏志节于冥昧之中，长人虚骄，昏人神智，上不足以辅国家，下不足以资事畜。破坏人才，国随贫弱。此之不除，徒补苴罅漏，张皇幽渺，无益也，虽练军实、讲通商，亦无益也。 讲西学： > 盖欲救中国之亡，则虽尧、舜、周、孔生今，舍班孟坚所谓通知外国事者，其道莫由。而欲通知外国事，则舍西学洋文不可，舍格致亦不可。 痛斥愚民政策： > 日本年来立格致学…
秦晖：想象下一个十年
02:55
有人说，中国现在经济发展了，但缺软实力。为什么？因为我们老是被西方的理念牵着鼻子走。我们应该提自己的价值，就是「仁义道德」。什么叫「仁义道德」呢？在十九世纪五六十年代，很多汉人出身的理学名臣，根本不知道西学是什么，但是他们一到了西方，第一个感觉就是那才是仁义道德。他们所讲的仁义道德，主要是讲西方国家对自己的人民的确是仁义道德，不涉及西方人对待中国人。
04:52
回过头来一看，中国对自己人是什么态度？很简单，就是不仁、不义、不道、不德。用他们的话来讲：二千年来之政，秦政也，皆大盗也；二千年来之学，荀学也，皆乡愿也；惟大盗利用乡愿，惟乡愿媚大盗。 #谭嗣同
05:35
不管你用的法理是民主自由人权，还是仁义道德，任何人对基本的真善美都有一定的标准。但是黑的就是黑的，白的就是白的，善的就是善的，恶的就是恶的，这一点不会因文化的差异而改变。当然，由于既得利益的结果，会引起价值观的扭曲。
02:55
有人说，中国现在经济发展了，但缺软实力。为什么？因为我们老是被西方的理念牵着鼻子走。我们应该提自己的价值，就是「仁义道德」。什么叫「仁义道德」呢？在十九世纪五六十年代，很多汉人出身的理学名臣，根本不知道西学是什么，但是他们一到了西方，第一个感觉就是那才是仁义道德。他们所讲的仁义道德，主要是讲西方国家对自己的人民的确是仁义道德，不涉及西方人对待中国人。
04:52
回过头来一看，中国对自己人是什么态度？很简单，就是不仁、不义、不道、不德。用他们的话来讲：二千年来之政，秦政也，皆大盗也；二千年来之学，荀学也，皆乡愿也；惟大盗利用乡愿，惟乡愿媚大盗。 #谭嗣同
05:35
不管你用的法理是民主自由人权，还是仁义道德，任何人对基本的真善美都有一定的标准。但是黑的就是黑的，白的就是白的，善的就是善的，恶的就是恶的，这一点不会因文化的差异而改变。当然，由于既得利益的结果，会引起价值观的扭曲。
❤3👍1
TomBen’s Web Excursions
https://fxtwitter.com/whyyoutouzhele/status/1697151288360788421
习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想学生读本（小学低年级）.pdf
49.5 MB
习近平新时代中国特色社会主义思想学生读本（小学低年级）
李老师发的图片在 PDF 页码的第 8、51、52 页。大多数情况下，我会将将扫描版 PDF OCR，但这本书不值得这样做。
李老师发的图片在 PDF 页码的第 8、51、52 页。大多数情况下，我会将将扫描版 PDF OCR，但这本书不值得这样做。
Xi’s Age of Stagnation
China’s dominant twentieth-century leaders, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, had adjusted their approach when they encountered setbacks; surely Xi and his closest advisers would, too. But none of that happened. Although the zero-COVID measures are gone, Beijing has clung to a strategy of accelerating government intervention in Chinese life.
Universities and research centers, including many with global ambitions, are increasingly cut off from their international counterparts.
Yet neijuan now permeates all aspects of life in Xi’s China, leaving the country more isolated and stagnant than during any extended period since Deng launched the reform era in the late 1970s.
Beijing’s bet seems to be that in order to withstand the pressures of an uncertain world, it must turn inward and succeed on its own. In doing so, however, it may instead be repeating the mistakes of its Eastern bloc predecessors in the middle decades of the Cold War.
Still more consequential may be the state’s now ubiquitous presence in Chinese intellectual life. Chinese leaders have always viewed universities somewhat suspiciously, installing party secretaries to oversee them and surrounding them with walls.
For outsiders, ordering a cab, buying a train ticket, and purchasing almost any goods requires a Chinese mobile phone, Chinese apps, and often a Chinese credit card. (Some apps now accommodate foreign credit cards, but not all vendors accept them.) Even a simple visit to a tourist site now requires scanning a QR code on a Chinese app and filling out a Chinese-language form. On one level, these hindrances are trivial, but they are also symptomatic of a government that seems almost unaware of the extent to which its ever more expansive centralization is closing the country off from the outside world.
Chinese astrophysicist and dissident Fang Lizhi observed in 1990, “About once each decade, the true face of history is thoroughly erased from the memory of Chinese society.”
In the communist states of Eastern Europe, the general prosperity of the immediate post–World War II era had diminished by the 1970s, causing many to look to dissidents and critics for explanations of their new reality. Could this happen in a China entering a similar long-term stagnation?
“You can’t do anything publicly in China,” he said. “But we still work and wait. We have time. They do not.”
China’s dominant twentieth-century leaders, Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, had adjusted their approach when they encountered setbacks; surely Xi and his closest advisers would, too. But none of that happened. Although the zero-COVID measures are gone, Beijing has clung to a strategy of accelerating government intervention in Chinese life.
Universities and research centers, including many with global ambitions, are increasingly cut off from their international counterparts.
Yet neijuan now permeates all aspects of life in Xi’s China, leaving the country more isolated and stagnant than during any extended period since Deng launched the reform era in the late 1970s.
Beijing’s bet seems to be that in order to withstand the pressures of an uncertain world, it must turn inward and succeed on its own. In doing so, however, it may instead be repeating the mistakes of its Eastern bloc predecessors in the middle decades of the Cold War.
Still more consequential may be the state’s now ubiquitous presence in Chinese intellectual life. Chinese leaders have always viewed universities somewhat suspiciously, installing party secretaries to oversee them and surrounding them with walls.
For outsiders, ordering a cab, buying a train ticket, and purchasing almost any goods requires a Chinese mobile phone, Chinese apps, and often a Chinese credit card. (Some apps now accommodate foreign credit cards, but not all vendors accept them.) Even a simple visit to a tourist site now requires scanning a QR code on a Chinese app and filling out a Chinese-language form. On one level, these hindrances are trivial, but they are also symptomatic of a government that seems almost unaware of the extent to which its ever more expansive centralization is closing the country off from the outside world.
Chinese astrophysicist and dissident Fang Lizhi observed in 1990, “About once each decade, the true face of history is thoroughly erased from the memory of Chinese society.”
In the communist states of Eastern Europe, the general prosperity of the immediate post–World War II era had diminished by the 1970s, causing many to look to dissidents and critics for explanations of their new reality. Could this happen in a China entering a similar long-term stagnation?
“You can’t do anything publicly in China,” he said. “But we still work and wait. We have time. They do not.”
Foreign Affairs
Xi’s Age of Stagnation
The great walling-off of China.
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How to Talk to People Who Disagree With You Politically
It can be challenging to talk to people who disagree with you politically. In this study, the Center for Media Engagement interviewed people who live in communities with a mix of political beliefs to glean their best strategies for talking to those with whom they disagree. The results offer five main approaches to talking across political differences.
• Focus on the people, not the politics
• Find common ground
• Stick to the facts and avoid confrontation
• Be an advocate, rather than an opponent
• Pick your battles
https://mediaengagement.org/research/divided-communities/
It can be challenging to talk to people who disagree with you politically. In this study, the Center for Media Engagement interviewed people who live in communities with a mix of political beliefs to glean their best strategies for talking to those with whom they disagree. The results offer five main approaches to talking across political differences.
• Focus on the people, not the politics
• Find common ground
• Stick to the facts and avoid confrontation
• Be an advocate, rather than an opponent
• Pick your battles
https://mediaengagement.org/research/divided-communities/
Center for Media Engagement
How to Talk to People Who Disagree with You Politically - Center for Media Engagement
It can be challenging to talk to people who disagree with you politically. In this study, the Center for Media Engagement interviewed people who live in communities with a mix of political beliefs to glean their best strategies for talking to those with whom…
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Useful Bullshit: Constitutions in Chinese Politics and Society
Drawing upon a wealth of archival sources from the Maoist and reform eras, Diamant deals with all facets of this constitutional discussion, as well as its afterlives in the late 50s, the Cultural Revolution, and the post-Mao era. Useful Bullshit illuminates how the Chinese government understands and makes use of the constitution as a political document, and how a vast array of citizens―police, workers, university students, women, and members of different ethnic and religious groups―have responded.
Diamant, Neil J. 2021. Useful Bullshit: Constitutions in Chinese Politics and Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501761287.
Drawing upon a wealth of archival sources from the Maoist and reform eras, Diamant deals with all facets of this constitutional discussion, as well as its afterlives in the late 50s, the Cultural Revolution, and the post-Mao era. Useful Bullshit illuminates how the Chinese government understands and makes use of the constitution as a political document, and how a vast array of citizens―police, workers, university students, women, and members of different ethnic and religious groups―have responded.
Diamant, Neil J. 2021. Useful Bullshit: Constitutions in Chinese Politics and Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781501761287.
chooser.crossref.org
Choose from multiple DOI resolution options
TomBen’s Web Excursions
Useful Bullshit: Constitutions in Chinese Politics and Society Drawing upon a wealth of archival sources from the Maoist and reform eras, Diamant deals with all facets of this constitutional discussion, as well as its afterlives in the late 50s, the Cultural…
Useful Bullshit.pdf
3.7 MB
我一直觉得中国的宪法是一个非常值得研究的主题，没想到已经有人做过研究，还写了这本书。
此书的标题，再配上这个封面，简直完美体现了 PRC 宪法的特点。当刘少奇、秦刚等权贵拿着宪法宣读其中的内容时，作为普通人，则应该拿出这本书来读一读。
此书的标题，再配上这个封面，简直完美体现了 PRC 宪法的特点。当刘少奇、秦刚等权贵拿着宪法宣读其中的内容时，作为普通人，则应该拿出这本书来读一读。
When China thought America might invade
Mao was a revolutionary who saw terror and anarchy as useful tools. By contrast, Xi Jinping, China’s supreme leader, is an austere nationalist obsessed with order and party control. For his part, Mao seems to have relished China’s break with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s and the turn to autarky that followed.
Mr Xi’s calls for self-reliance in food and in core technologies are more complicated. Even as his regime abhors dependency on America, its envoys tirelessly lobby Western allies in Asia and Europe to provide know-how that China needs to grow strong.
For all those differences, the Third Front should be studied by blithe sorts who insist that Mr Xi’s party must deliver growth and material prosperity to maintain its legitimacy, and so will never break with the rich West.
Economic self-interest is a powerful force. But a lesson from 1964 is that once America seemed truly to threaten China, economic planners fell silent and security fanatics took charge.
Mao was a revolutionary who saw terror and anarchy as useful tools. By contrast, Xi Jinping, China’s supreme leader, is an austere nationalist obsessed with order and party control. For his part, Mao seems to have relished China’s break with the Soviet Union in the early 1960s and the turn to autarky that followed.
Mr Xi’s calls for self-reliance in food and in core technologies are more complicated. Even as his regime abhors dependency on America, its envoys tirelessly lobby Western allies in Asia and Europe to provide know-how that China needs to grow strong.
For all those differences, the Third Front should be studied by blithe sorts who insist that Mr Xi’s party must deliver growth and material prosperity to maintain its legitimacy, and so will never break with the rich West.
Economic self-interest is a powerful force. But a lesson from 1964 is that once America seemed truly to threaten China, economic planners fell silent and security fanatics took charge.
The Economist
When China thought America might invade
Economic logic was not enough to stop a ruinous Mao-era drive for self-reliance
TomBen’s Web Excursions
断缴社保的年轻人 https://pca.st/zkpbtlxc
这篇论文以 COVID-19 期间中国推出的健康码应用为研究对象，深入探讨了「生物识别公民身份」这一新兴社会调控模式在当代中国的实施与其局限性。论文首先回顾了从社会主义到新自由主义的转型过程中，党国的治理目标是如何从生物/生命政治型公民身份演变到生物识别型的。接着，借助媒体报道和社交媒体评论，文章揭示了健康码是如何强化这一生物识别范式，并通过切割原本较为稳定的生物/生命政治型公民身份的时间维度，以达到更严格的社会控制。这一预防性的控制系统不仅增强了国家的自我调节和自保能力，也提升了对人们生产力的管理，但它同时也打破了人们的传统生活习惯，并进一步边缘化了生产力逐渐减弱的群体，如老年人和残疾人。
在论文的结论部分，作者提到在 2021 年末完成该论文时，「躺平」在中国广泛流行。她们将健康码这一严格的社会控制手段与之联系起来，认为在当前愈发强大的监控体制下，生活变得越来越难以为继。很多中国人都觉得「躺平」是在面对不断扩大的社会不平等时，一种有效的不合作方式。这一充满矛盾和压力的局面使许多中国公民感到他们的生活不再可持续或值得活下去，这可能激发出更多创新性的抵抗和颠覆行为，为我们理解健康码这类严格的社会控制提供了新的视角。
Zhang, Jingxue, and Charlie Yi Zhang. 2023. “’Enter with Green Code Only’: Biometric Citizenship and Fragmented Living in China.” The Journal of Asian Studies 82 (3): 385–406. https://doi.org/10.1215/00219118-10471971.
在论文的结论部分，作者提到在 2021 年末完成该论文时，「躺平」在中国广泛流行。她们将健康码这一严格的社会控制手段与之联系起来，认为在当前愈发强大的监控体制下，生活变得越来越难以为继。很多中国人都觉得「躺平」是在面对不断扩大的社会不平等时，一种有效的不合作方式。这一充满矛盾和压力的局面使许多中国公民感到他们的生活不再可持续或值得活下去，这可能激发出更多创新性的抵抗和颠覆行为，为我们理解健康码这类严格的社会控制提供了新的视角。
Zhang, Jingxue, and Charlie Yi Zhang. 2023. “’Enter with Green Code Only’: Biometric Citizenship and Fragmented Living in China.” The Journal of Asian Studies 82 (3): 385–406. https://doi.org/10.1215/00219118-10471971.
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US extends science pact with China: what it means for research
The US government has extended for six months a key symbolic agreement to cooperate with China in science and technology. The agreement was due to expire on 27 August, and its short-term extension has revived researchers’ hopes that the 44-year-old pact will continue.
The pact does not provide research funding. Rather, it is an umbrella agreement to encourage collaboration and goodwill between US and Chinese government agencies, universities and institutions doing research in agriculture, energy, health, the environment and other fields. The extension means that, for now, research will continue as normal.
The US government has extended for six months a key symbolic agreement to cooperate with China in science and technology. The agreement was due to expire on 27 August, and its short-term extension has revived researchers’ hopes that the 44-year-old pact will continue.
The pact does not provide research funding. Rather, it is an umbrella agreement to encourage collaboration and goodwill between US and Chinese government agencies, universities and institutions doing research in agriculture, energy, health, the environment and other fields. The extension means that, for now, research will continue as normal.
Nature
US extends science pact with China: what it means for research
Nature - But the move is a stop-gap measure, and scientists warn that anything short of a full-scale renewal could damage research collaborations
Why Note-Taking Apps Don’t Make Us Smarter
One interpretation of these events is that the software failed: that journaling and souped-up links simply don’t have the power some of us once hoped they did.
Another view, though, is that they are up against a much stronger foe — the infinite daily distractions of the internet.
Gloria Mark, a professor of information science at the University of California, Irvine, and the author of “Attention Span,” started researching the way people used computers in 2004. The average time people spent on a single screen was 2.5 minutes. By 2012, Mark and her colleagues found the average time on a single task was 75 seconds. Now it’s down to about 47.
Initially, I threw myself into this kind of associative note-taking. I gathered links around concepts I wanted to explore (“the internet enables information to travel too quickly,” for example, or social networks and polarization). When I had an interesting conversation with a person, I would add notes to a personal page I had created for them. A few times a week, I would revisit those notes.
I waited for the insights to come.
And waited. And waited.
My second thought is that if you want to take good notes, you have to first extract your mind from the acid bath.
The reason, sadly, is that thinking takes place in your brain. And thinking is an active pursuit — one that often happens when you are spending long stretches of time staring into space, then writing a bit, and then staring into space a bit more. It’s here here that the connections are made and the insights are formed. And it is a process that stubbornly resists automation.
“The goal is not to take notes — the goal is to think effectively,” Matuschak writes. “Better questions are ‘what practices can help me reliably develop insights over time?’ [and] ‘how can I shepherd my attention effectively?’”
One interpretation of these events is that the software failed: that journaling and souped-up links simply don’t have the power some of us once hoped they did.
Another view, though, is that they are up against a much stronger foe — the infinite daily distractions of the internet.
Gloria Mark, a professor of information science at the University of California, Irvine, and the author of “Attention Span,” started researching the way people used computers in 2004. The average time people spent on a single screen was 2.5 minutes. By 2012, Mark and her colleagues found the average time on a single task was 75 seconds. Now it’s down to about 47.
Initially, I threw myself into this kind of associative note-taking. I gathered links around concepts I wanted to explore (“the internet enables information to travel too quickly,” for example, or social networks and polarization). When I had an interesting conversation with a person, I would add notes to a personal page I had created for them. A few times a week, I would revisit those notes.
I waited for the insights to come.
And waited. And waited.
My second thought is that if you want to take good notes, you have to first extract your mind from the acid bath.
The reason, sadly, is that thinking takes place in your brain. And thinking is an active pursuit — one that often happens when you are spending long stretches of time staring into space, then writing a bit, and then staring into space a bit more. It’s here here that the connections are made and the insights are formed. And it is a process that stubbornly resists automation.
“The goal is not to take notes — the goal is to think effectively,” Matuschak writes. “Better questions are ‘what practices can help me reliably develop insights over time?’ [and] ‘how can I shepherd my attention effectively?’”
The Verge
Why note-taking apps don’t make us smarter
Their big promise has fizzled out.
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TomBen’s Web Excursions
Why Note-Taking Apps Don’t Make Us Smarter One interpretation of these events is that the software failed: that journaling and souped-up links simply don’t have the power some of us once hoped they did. Another view, though, is that they are up against…
Successful doctoral thesis using DEVONthink
Just wanted to drop a note to say thank you to the DEVONThink team. I have recently successfully completed my DPhil at Oxford, and actually finished somewhat early compared to my deadline. I used DT extensively, and am super happy with its search, ability to work across different formats of documents, and be scripted, all of which I used heavily. Thank you!
Recently, our attention got caught by the extraordinary career of a diligent student from Oxford, England. This May, Lyndon Drake received his Doctor of Philosophy (DPhil) degree in Theology: Congratulations! We are honored to be part of his journey and happy to share some of his thoughts and tips with you.
I submitted my thesis after five years of part-time work, the same time many full-time students need. DEVONthink was a significant part of being able to work efficiently.
Lyndon’s wish: some convenient way to keep thoughts and comments, annotations and notes, in the same Markdown document attached to the actual PDF.
The main task is to simply sit down every single day and write words.
Just wanted to drop a note to say thank you to the DEVONThink team. I have recently successfully completed my DPhil at Oxford, and actually finished somewhat early compared to my deadline. I used DT extensively, and am super happy with its search, ability to work across different formats of documents, and be scripted, all of which I used heavily. Thank you!
Recently, our attention got caught by the extraordinary career of a diligent student from Oxford, England. This May, Lyndon Drake received his Doctor of Philosophy (DPhil) degree in Theology: Congratulations! We are honored to be part of his journey and happy to share some of his thoughts and tips with you.
I submitted my thesis after five years of part-time work, the same time many full-time students need. DEVONthink was a significant part of being able to work efficiently.
Lyndon’s wish: some convenient way to keep thoughts and comments, annotations and notes, in the same Markdown document attached to the actual PDF.
The main task is to simply sit down every single day and write words.
DEVONtechnologies Community
Successful doctoral thesis using DT
Just wanted to drop a note to say thank you to the DEVONThink team. I have recently successfully completed my DPhil at Oxford, and actually finished somewhat early compared to my deadline. I used DT extensively, and am super happy with its search, ability…
Fendou: A keyword of Chinese modernity
This article analyses the modern historical trajectory of the word fendou (奋斗, ‘struggle’), from its emergence in the early twentieth century to the present. Originally embedded in a Social Darwinist philosophy of struggle, fendou was later co-opted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
As one of its key ideological shibboleths, it was typically used to mobilize the Chinese people to ‘struggle’ for the goals of the nation. However, as these goals varied significantly in the course of the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the actual meanings and uses of fendou evolved accordingly, following shifts in the ideological paradigms that characterized the different eras.
By studying how this term was used as an ideological keyword over time, it is possible to observe the continuities and discontinuities in the visions of struggle, and the relevant ‘pedagogies of struggle’, promoted in different periods by the Chinese state.
The article, in particular, analyses the use of fendou in both contemporary official discourse and popular culture, suggesting that in promoting the formation of a competitive subject in line with the aims of the ‘socialist market’, fendou still, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, expresses and disseminates a predominantly Social Darwinist world view.
To cite this article: Fumian, Marco. 2021. “Fendou: A Keyword of Chinese Modernity.” Modern Asian Studies 55 (4): 1268–1314. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X20000128.
This article analyses the modern historical trajectory of the word fendou (奋斗, ‘struggle’), from its emergence in the early twentieth century to the present. Originally embedded in a Social Darwinist philosophy of struggle, fendou was later co-opted by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
As one of its key ideological shibboleths, it was typically used to mobilize the Chinese people to ‘struggle’ for the goals of the nation. However, as these goals varied significantly in the course of the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the actual meanings and uses of fendou evolved accordingly, following shifts in the ideological paradigms that characterized the different eras.
By studying how this term was used as an ideological keyword over time, it is possible to observe the continuities and discontinuities in the visions of struggle, and the relevant ‘pedagogies of struggle’, promoted in different periods by the Chinese state.
The article, in particular, analyses the use of fendou in both contemporary official discourse and popular culture, suggesting that in promoting the formation of a competitive subject in line with the aims of the ‘socialist market’, fendou still, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, expresses and disseminates a predominantly Social Darwinist world view.
To cite this article: Fumian, Marco. 2021. “Fendou: A Keyword of Chinese Modernity.” Modern Asian Studies 55 (4): 1268–1314. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X20000128.
Cambridge Core
Fendou: A keyword of Chinese modernity | Modern Asian Studies | Cambridge Core
Fendou: A keyword of Chinese modernity - Volume 55 Issue 4
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The changes happened in China for the past four decades were physical rather than chemical in nature.
https://twitter.com/yashenghuang/status/1698496629035209173
https://twitter.com/yashenghuang/status/1698496629035209173
X (formerly Twitter)
Yasheng Huang 黄亚生 on X
The changes that China has made since 1978 have been momentous but I have always felt that those changes are physical rather than chemical in nature. As physical changes they can be reversed and changed back. This is what is happening in China now.
ChatGPT, GPT-4, and Other Large Language Models: The Next Revolution for Clinical Microbiology?
In this opinion article, I describe how chatbot technologies work and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of ChatGPT, GPT-4, and other LLMs for applications in the routine diagnostic laboratory, focusing on various use cases for the pre- to post-analytical process.
https://doi.org/10.1093/cid/ciad407
In this opinion article, I describe how chatbot technologies work and discuss the strengths and weaknesses of ChatGPT, GPT-4, and other LLMs for applications in the routine diagnostic laboratory, focusing on various use cases for the pre- to post-analytical process.
https://doi.org/10.1093/cid/ciad407
OUP Academic
ChatGPT, GPT-4, and Other Large Language Models: The Next Revolution for Clinical Microbiology?
Natural language processing–based computer software simulates and processes human conversation. These potentially disruptive large language model technologies h